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Abstract
We develop a theoretical model in which NGOs financed by foreign
donors engage in two types of activities in a developing country: service
provision and advocacy. In the model, service provision relieves poverty,
but these aid resources risk embezzlement by corrupt authorities. Advocacy
can encourage the local population to demand more transparency to the
authorities, reducing embezzlement at the cost of investing fewer efforts in
direct poverty alleviation. We find that in general advocacy will be under-
provided because its benefit, improved governance, has the characteristics
of a public good. NGOs can remedy to this under-provision by coordinating
their actions, but because this coordination threatens the rents of the local
authorities, officials will respond to coordination attempts by cracking down
on NGOs. Full coordination is therefore undesirable: crackdown of NGOs
will be too strong, which reduces service provision and hurts beneficiaries.
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1 Introduction
In the last few years, the international community has multiplied efforts directed
at improving foreign aid effectiveness. From being practically absent at the ini-
tial debates at the High Level Fora on Aid Effectivness (Paris, 2005; Accra, 2008;
Busan 2011), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) became formally recog-
nised as full and equal participants to the negotiations at the Busan summit
in 2011. The agreements praise NGOs as vectors to improve both aid alloca-
tion and governance in the foreign aid recipient countries. In practical terms,
by delegating aid to NGOs and circumventing governments allow aid resources
to be earmarked for final beneciaries of aid, dismissing the issue of fungibil-
ity altogether (for developments and critiques of these arguments, see Edwards
and Hulme 1996; Mercer 2002; Collier and Dollar 2004; Dreher et al. 2007;
Nunnenkamp et al. 2009) and to involve local citizens into shaping developing
strategies. Accompanying this formal recognition, donor countries have consid-
erably increased their financial support to NGOs. Roughly one-fifth of all official
OECD aid money was delivered through NGOs in 2013, double of what it was
just ten years ago (?). When private donations are added, ? estimate that
the amount of aid delivered by NGOs is roughly equal to that of aid delivered
through official channels.
The increased reliance on the NGO sector raises two important issues: the co-
ordination among NGOs and the tensions with receipient countries. In this
regard, at the High Level Fora on aid effectiveness, the agreements stressed
the importance of harmonizing aid among donors, without clearly stating how
this harmonization can be achieved. Relying on a decentralized, atomistic, and
heterogeneous multitude of NGOs, each of them driven by their own intrinsic ob-
jectives challenges the idea of harmonizing aid. Likewise, the legitimation of the
advocacy power of the NGOs have seen a surge of tensions between high-handed
rulers and the non-governmental sector. While rent-seeking authorities can take
advantage of the presence of service-providing NGOs, directly through extortion
or indirectly through the mismanagement of fungible public funds, they also
risk being confronted to a sector that encourages beneficiaries into demanding
greater accountability to the ruling elite.
It results that in reent years governments of countries such as Venezuela, Zim-
babwe, Russia, Egypt, and several others have stringently audited, fined, intim-
idated, and ultimately expelled NGOs from their territories (?).
In this paper, we contribute to the literature by explicitly modelling the
trade-off between the provision of welfare-enhancing services and the engage-
ment into governance-enhancing advocacy. In particular, NGOs can allocate
their resources between two activities: the provision of poverty-alleviating ser-
vices, such as health and education, and the financing of advocacy activities. If
effective, advocacy activities can motivate targeted beneficiaries into appropriat-
ing aid projects that are intended for them. However, if advocating for improved
governance results in a crackdown on the aid sector, which cripples the amounts
of aid provided, then one wonders if it is worth for NGOs to engage in advo-
cacy at all. Two main assumptions drive our model: first, we assume that the
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advocacy content of the activities of the NGO is not contractible ex-ante with
the host government. Second, we assume that the benefit of advocacy, namely
improved governance, has the characteristics of a public good, in that better
governance is non-rival and non-excludable. In our model, three types of agents
interact: the host government, NGOs, and the local population. In particular,
we focus on the numerous choices and constraints that NGOs face interacting
with each other, with the local authorities, and with the local population. NGOs
look for an optimal allocation of their efforts between service provision and ad-
vocacy, the latter of which brings upon the benefits of improved governance.
We assume that NGOs are heterogeneous in their incomes and their preferences
towards advocacy, and moreover, they can coordinate with each other.
Our results show that advocacy efforts will typically be under-provided be-
cause of the public good characteristics of better governance. While free riding
inefficiencies undermine the provision of advocacy efforts, addressing this ineffi-
ciency through an increased focus on governance, or through intensified coordi-
nation efforts, makes the government strengthen its crackdown on NGOs. As a
result, although some degree of advocacy is desirable, increasing it to the point of
abolishing free riding inefficiencies is not optimal because corrupt authorities will
react by shutting down too many NGOs compared to a second-best optimum.
We prove the existence of such a second-best optimal degree of advocacy and we
derive its properties, in particular its incompatibility with a state where there
is no free riding in advocacy. A direct policy implication is that donors cannot
– and should not – expect that all forms of free riding disappear, at least not
through a bottom-up approach only. In this regard, results of our model suggest
that proponents of a bottom-up approach to development should not go too far
in dismissing the role of multilateral and bilateral donors (??). While merits of
NGOs in the field can be plentiful, they require an enabling environment allows
their initiatives to thrive, while their actions are legitimately and democratically
monitored. Bilateral and multilateral donors have the diplomatic and economic
power capable of demanding that such enabling environment is set in place.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the main lit-
erature, Section 3 describes and solves the basic model. Section 4 develops the
model towards specifications in which NGOs are able to cooperate or have polit-
ical preferences. Section 5 discusses the model in light of its policy implications.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Scholars in social sciences highlight the role of NGOs as promoters of good gover-
nance as frequently as they emphasise their role as service providers, but rarely
do they expose the constraints faced by NGOs when they strive to empower
people (?). The economic literature outlines the potential comparative advan-
tages of nonprofits in the provision of public services relative to governments or
for-profits (????). The literature dealing with the political economy of multilat-
eral or bilateral foreign aid, can be traced back at least half a century (?????).
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Studying the political economy of foreign aid when it is provided by private
nonprofits is, however, a relatively recent endeavour (?????, Chapter 1).
The literature on aid efficiency typically models the problem of aid alloca-
tion as a principalagent relationship between multilateral and bilateral donors
(the principals) and recipient governments (the agents). In this context, the
literature claims that aid conditionality and aid coordination are required to
enhance the governance of recipient countries (?????). However, donors often
lack credibility regarding their willingness to coordinate and enforce sanctions,
which challenges the feasibility of this approach. Instead, many authors see in a
bottom-up approach the most effective way towards improved governance (??).
Indeed, if donor countries cannot commit to demand governance improvements
from the top, then they should design a way of increasing the bargaining power
of the grassroots from the bottom. In order to do this, relying on the NGO
sector appears as the most feasible alternative. In practical terms, the Busan
Partnership legitimates NGOs as vital service providers and advocates of the
poor, assigning them a double mission: to produce a tangible output that re-
lieves poverty, and to advocate institutional change that grants new rights to
the poor (??).
Our paper presents the first attempt at modelling NGOs when they carry
out both advocacy efforts and service provision. It does not deal with activities
targeted at lobbying authorities; such issues usually concern governments of
developed countries (?). Instead, and in line with models of aid coordination,
such as those of ? and ?, we consider a setting with multiple donors and the
government of a poor country. Their conclusion is that aid coordination is always
desirable for beneficiaries of aid, although it can be costly and even detrimental
for donors. Focusing on the NGO sector brings about different conclusions. In
our setting, too much coordination can be detrimental not only to donors, but
also to beneficiaries. The main difference is that, unlike multilateral donors
contracting with governments, NGOs operate in the field. This feature means
that NGOs must interact with the local population and integrate with local
politics, under the constraint of the legislation of the host country.
3 Basic Model
3.1 Set Up
Three types of players interact in this model. These are: the government of the
host country (denoted G), the citizens it governs (C), and a set of N NGOs
willing to operate in the country, indexed by i = {1, ..., n, .., N}. We assume
that due to the atomistic nature of the NGO sector, N is arbitrarily high.
Actions of the players occur in the following sequence: the government
chooses the number (n) of NGOs authorized to operate in the country; once
authorized, each NGO has to decide how much of its exogenous budget bi it
allocates between investing in providing services (si) and investing in advocacy
(vi); in the last step, citizens exposed to advocacy and aware of the existence
of projects can engage in costly appropriation efforts (a), which allow them to
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obtain ownership over aid projects.
We define ‘appropriation efforts’ as any costly initiatives engaged by cit-
izens, which allow them to discourage embezzlement by government officials.
Appropriation efforts can take the form of protests, petitions, trials, votes for
the opposition, and similar endeavours. Citizens obtain ownership of a share
0 < ω(a) ≤ 1 of aid projects si when they engage in a level of appropriation
effort a. To make matters simple, specify ownership gain technology ω(a) as an
isoelastic function up to a threshold a˜ such that
ω(a) = κa
1
1+ρ if 1 ≤ a < a˜
ω(a) = 1 if a ≥ a˜
with ρ ≥ 0, 0 < κ ≤ 1 and a˜ = κ−(1+ρ). ρ measures the ability of the gov-
ernment to withstand appropriation efforts without having to make concessions.
κ marks the ownership level at baseline normalized appropriation efforts a = 1.
If at the baseline there is full ownership (κ = 1), then there is no room for ap-
propriation gains. Ownership gains ω(a) are increasing and concave in a. The
assumption of concavity guarantees that there is an interior solution for a, and
reflects a process of gradual gain of ownership through more appropriation ef-
forts. A convex function would generate corner solutions (either a = 1 or a = a˜),
more suited to model civil conflict or government overthrows. In this paper, we
maintain the focus on non-drastic changes.
The payoff function of the government writes
UG = [1− ω(a)] s. (1)
in which s = ΣNi si is the aggregate amount of aid invested in development
projects. The payoff of corrupt authorities increases with the amount of resources
they can embezzle and reduces with level of appropriation efforts exerted by
citizens. Appropriation efforts are costly, which we make explicit in the citizen’s
payoff function:
UP = ω(a)s− a
vλ
(2)
in which v = Σivi are the aggregate advocacy efforts provided by the NGO
sector. Citizens benefit from the projects to the extent that they obtain actual
ownership over them. They can increase their ownership through appropria-
tion efforts, made cheaper by the NGO’s advocacy input. Advocacy reduces
the marginal cost of petitioning the government by providing informational, le-
gal, political, or other types of intangible assistance. The intangible nature of
these services makes them both simultaneously non-contractible and impossible
to embezzle. The efficiency of advocacy efforts is variable and depends on how
convincing the arguments of the NGO are, and on the degree to which ben-
eficiaries are willing to listen. Parameter λ measures the ability of NGOs to
mobilize appropriation efforts through advocacy, with low values denoting low
responsiveness of citizens to campaigning.
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The aforementioned payoff functions of both government and citizens are
highly stylized in order to concentrate attention in the modelling of the NGO
sector. In the benchmark case, the simplest payoff function for any NGO is
UNGOi = ω(a)si (3)
which it maximizes subject to the constraint bi = si+vi. In this simple case,
an NGO cares about the size of its own project and on the degree of ownership of
the project by its beneficiaries. While advocacy does not entail direct benefits,
the NGO understands that it drives the appropriation efforts of the beneficiaries,
which in turn makes the project more valuable. Through this section, we model
NGOs as imperfectly altruistic: they only care about the well-being created by
their own project, but not about the well-being created by the overall NGO
sector. This assumption is relaxed in the extensions.
CitizensNGOs
The Government
1− ω(a)
ω(a)
n
(Stage 1)
Σvi
(Stage 2)
Σsi
(Stage 2)
a
(Stage 3)
[1− ω(a)]s
(Final Stage)
ω(a)s
(Final Stage)
Figure 1: Timing of the model.
The timing of the game is simple; a three-stage, one-shot game is sufficient
to derive our main results. In the first stage, the government knows the income
distribution of all NGOs willing to enter the country and authorizes operations
for n NGOs. In the second stage, all authorized NGOs simultaneously allocate
their budget between providing services (si) and investing in advocacy (vi). At
the last stage, citizens decide upon the effort they put into appropriating the
projects (a). Finally, all players receive their payoff. This mechanism is schemed
in Figure ??.
The choice of the number of players (NGOs) by the government or the con-
tinuous action space for NGOs makes the classic extensive-form representation of
the game impractical to display, nonetheless we can easily solve it by backward
induction and subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
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3.2 Analysis
The model is solved by backward induction. At the last stage, n ≥ 1 NGOs
active in the country have invested Σibi monetary units, of which Σisi financed
development projects, and Σivi financed advocacy. Citizens choose the level of
effort put into appropriating aid projects by solving the following program:
Max
a
ω(a)Σisi − a
(Σivi)λ (4)
The first-order condition that optimizes this problem is ωa(a
∗)s = v−λ, in
which s = Σisi, and v = Σivi. The isoelastic properties of ω(a) allow that
ωa(a) =
κ
1 + ρ
[
1
1 + a
] ρ
1+ρ
=
κ1+ρ
1 + ρ
1
ωρ
.
We can rewrite the citizens FOC as an equilibrium condition at the 3rd stage
ω(a) = max
{
κ,
[
κ1+ρ
1 + ρ
svλ
] 1
ρ
}
, (5)
It is immediately obvious that ownership and appropriation efforts are in-
creasing in both service provision and advocacy, with respective elasticities 1/ρ
and λ/ρ.
At the second stage, each individual NGO solves the following maximization
problem1:
Max
si,vi
ωsi
s.t bi = si + vi [Non-Distribution Constraint],
ω =
[
κ1+ρ
1 + ρ
svλ
] 1
ρ
[3rd stage equilibrium condition, (??)],
and (s∗j , v
∗
j ) ∈ argmax
sj ,vj
ωsj ,∀j 6= i [Best response of n− 1 NGOs].
where a∗ and the case in which a∗ = 0 are made implicit to alleviate notation.
Solving the programme of the NGOs yields the following solution:
v∗ =
λ
1 + λ+ nρ
b (6)
and
s∗ =
1 + nρ
1 + λ+ nρ
b. (7)
in which b = Σibi are the aggregated budgets.
1Akin to a budget constraint, the term non-distribution constraint is usually employed when
referring to nonprofits since ?.
7
Proposition 1 (Aggregate investments in service provision and advocacy)
If n NGOs are allowed to operate in the country, then
1. if advocacy and appropriation efforts have high returns, then NGOs invest
a larger share of aid in advocacy;
2. if advocacy increases, then so do appropriation efforts;
3. if aid is fractioned, then NGOs free ride more on advocacy;
4. both advocacy and service provision monotonically increase with the number
of NGOs.
Proof 1 The total derivative maximizing the objective function yields the fol-
lowing equilibrium condition:
dω
dsi
si + ω = 0⇒ Σni=1
[
dω
dsi
si + ω
]
= 0⇒ dω
ds
s+ ωn = 0
since ds/dsi = 1. The logarithmic derivative of the 3
rd stage equilibrium
condition (??) with respect to s yields
ρ
dω
ds
s
ω
= 1 +
dv
ds
s
v
(8)
By the non-distribution constraint, dv/ds = −1. Combing the two previous
equations states the following second stage equilibrium condition:
v
s
=
λ
1 + nρ
(9)
Plugging this condition in the non-distribution constraint yields the desired
solution. 
A fragmented aid sector makes advocacy prone to free riding because its
benefit, improved governance, has the characteristics of a public good. Corrupt
officials have thus an incentive to sow discord among NGOs, inducing them to
free ride more on advocacy.
We can disaggregate the levels of advocacy and investment in projects at the
individual level to display the second-stage subgame Nash equilibrium:
s∗i =
1 + nρ
1 + λ+ nρ
b
and
v∗i = bi −
1 + nρ
1 + λ+ nρ
b
in which b = b/n. Richer NGOs are willing to contribute more to advocacy,
i.e. to the public good. As the average budget increases, so does the incentive
to free ride on other contributors.
This result is standard in the theory of public goods, although not necessarily
realistic in our context; in reality, politically motivated NGOs actively exert
advocacy efforts, no matter how small they are. On the contrary, large NGOs
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can be timid militants. We address the question of political motivation in the
next section.
Before looking at the optimization problem of the government, it is useful to
show that free riding creates inefficiencies. Because we are concerned with the
effectiveness of aid, our well-being criterion is the payoff function of the citizens
only. We defend this choice with two arguments: (i) interests of NGOs should be
aligned with those of their beneficiaries, so that the well-being of NGOs should
be perfectly correlated with the well-being of citizens; and (ii) we care about
ownership of aid. By adding the well-being of corrupt officials, we would care
about absolute levels of aid, disregarding the issue of its distribution.
From the perspective of NGOs, the reaction function of the citizens, ω =
s1/ρvλ/ρ, displays an inverse U-shaped relationship between advocacy and ap-
propriation efforts, as shown in Figure ??. It reaches its maximum level when
vmax = argmax
v
(ω) =
λ
1 + λ
b. (10)
If the choices of NGOs result in corner solutions (all aid is invested in either
projects or advocacy), there are no changes in appropriation efforts and owner-
ship remains at a baseline ω(0). Intuitively, without advocacy efforts, there are
no changes in appropriation efficiency, and without projects, there is no reason
to change baseline appropriation efforts.
A low λ indicates that advocacy has little impact on the cost of appropria-
tion efforts. This can happen because the message of the NGO is too weak or
because beneficiaries are already highly organized and have little to gain from
the NGO’s input. Conversely, high returns of advocacy are most likely to occur
when beneficiaries are disorganized and uninformed.
To compute the first-best level of advocacy, plug the FOC of the citizens
back in to their payoff function. Evaluated at their optimized level, the utility
of citizens is UC = ωs ρ1+ρ .
Which yields the following optimal level of advocacy:
vop =
λ
1 + λ+ ρ
b. (11)
Proposition 2 (Free-ridding Inefficiency) If the amount of aid that a coun-
try receives is fixed, then a single NGO should manage all of it.
Proof 2 The total derivative of the citizens payoff relative to s is
dω
ds
s+ ω = 0
Plugging in (??) yields
v
s
=
λ
1 + ρ
Combining this with the non-distribution constraint yields the desired solution.

Figure ?? plots this optimum over the reaction function of the citizens. An
indifference curve shows the optimal decentralized choice of an NGO when the
sector is competitive.
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ωΣivi
Σibi
ΣibiΣisi
vmaxv∗ vop
U˜NGOi
κ
Figure 2: Levels of advocacy at the equilibrium, optimum, and maximum ap-
propriation.
The equilibrium choice of the NGO is the tangency point between its indif-
ference curve and the reaction function of citizens. As fragmentation increases
among NGOs, each will chose lower levels of advocacy, drifting away from the
optimal monopolistic situation. Advocacy levels that maximize appropriation
efforts are not optimal either, unless these efforts are efficient in achieving own-
ership (if ρ is low). Otherwise, when intents of gaining ownership have no real
effect due to the tight grip of the authorities, encouraging appropriation is waste-
ful. Next, we close the model by solving the problem of rent-seeking officials.
Turn now to the first stage. To alleviate notation, we drop the asterisk
from equilibrium values v∗ and s∗. Likewise, and without loss of generality,
we assume continuity of the number of NGOs, imposing the restriction that,
if allowed to operate, there should be at least one (i.e. n ∈ [1,∞[ ). If the
government could contract the advocacy content of aid, it would fix it to zero.
However, this contract is unenforceable, because it is too demanding to monitor
and to disentangle what part of aid is a service and which is nurturing political
leadership. From the point of view of the authorities, the only observable variable
is the presence or not of NGOs, given that they deliver the authorizations to
operate. The program of the government is

Max
n
(1− ω)s
s.t b¯n = v + s, [Aggregated Non-Distribution Constraints],
ω =
[
κ1+ρ
1 + ρ
svλ
] 1
ρ
[3rd stage equilibrium condition, (??)],
and
v
s
=
λ
1 + nρ
[2nd stage equilibrium condition, (??)].
Because s(n) is a bijective and monotonically increasing function of n, solving
this problem is akin to choosing the optimal s for the government. The first order
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condition expressed in terms of the total derivative of the objective function with
respect to s is
1− ω = dω
ds
s. (12)
This equilibrium condition states that the marginal benefit of allowing one
additional unit of service provision (the captured share 1−ω of that unit) must
equal the marginal cost of having the beneficiaries’ share improve. To obtain a
more explicit expression of the right-hand side of this equation, take logarithmic
derivative of the third stage equilibrium condition with respect to s:
dω
ds
s
ω
=
1
ρ
[
1 + λ
dv
ds
s
v
]
(13)
The second term inside the square brackets is proportional to the elasticity
of advocacy to services provision.
Lemma 1 The elasticity of advocacy to services provision is
ε =
dv
ds
s
v
=
1
1 +
1
1
ρn +
λ
1+λ+ρn
(14)
In which ε ∈ [0, 1] decreases in n and ρ and increases in λ, with limn→0 ε(n) =
1 and limn→∞ ε(n) = 0.
The appendix proves this statement. To each percentage increase of service
provision, there is an increase in advocacy, which is marginally declining as the
free riding problem aggravates. Combining (??), (??) and (??) obtains the 1st
stage equilibrium condition:
1− ω = 1 + λε
1 + ρ+ λε
(15)
Denote the left-hand side MB(n) for marginal benefit and the right-hand
side MC(n) for marginal cost. MB(n) and MC(n) are non-increasing, and as a
result of continuity and their limit conditions, are single-crossing if the following
condition holds:
ρ
1 + ρ+ λ
> κ (16)
This condition states that the government will allow NGOs only if it can
withstand appropriation efforts with ease, if the baseline ownership by benefi-
ciaries is low, and if advocacy has sufficiently low returns. Figure ?? plots both
functions and the equilibrium condition. Marginal costs are declining due to the
free riding properties of our problem: allowing more NGOs increases ownership,
but in a marginally declining manner.
Let MU(n) = MB(n) −MC(n) = 0 be the marginal payoff of n. Table ??
summarizes the sign of the partial derivatives of functions MB(n) and MC(n)
for any n. The appendix details these computations. In line with proposition 1,
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MB(n)
MC(n)
n
$
1+λ
1+ρ+λ
1
1+ρ
1− κ
n∗
1− ω∗
λ, b, κ
ρ
ρ
λ
Figure 3: Marginal Benefits and Costs of allowing one additional unit NGO
the parameters that increase the share of total aid devoted to service provision
increase the marginal benefits and reduce the marginal costs for the government.
∂MB(n) ∂MC(n) ∂MU(n)
∂ρ + − +
∂λ − + −
∂b − 0 −
∂κ − 0 −
Table 1: Partial derivatives for MB(n) and MC(n) function.
Proposition 3 (Number of NGOs allowed by the Government) If con-
dition (??) holds, the authorities cannot observe each individual NGO’s income,
and cannot contract advocacy content, then they will deliver a unique number
of permits n∗, which maps a unique level of services s∗. The number of NGOs
allowed will increase if
1. NGOs’ advocacy has low returns,
2. appropriation efforts have low returns,
3. agencies are poorer on average, and
4. baseline ownership is low.
Proof 3 Notice that at the crossing point ∂MC(n∗)/∂n > ∂MB(n∗)/∂n. By
implicit derivation and using the partial derivatives stated above:
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dn∗
dλ
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂λ
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
< 0 ;
dn∗
dρ
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂ρ
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
> 0 ;
and
dn∗
db
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂b
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
< 0. 
The results provided in proposition 3 are quite intuitive. The government
will be more tolerant of the NGO sector if it does not consider it a threat. The
model predicts that areas under tight grip by corrupt authorities, or where NGOs
have little influence, will host more NGOs, which will have high incentives to
free ride on each other.
Corollary 1 In a regime under which the government has a tight control on the
access of NGOs, beneficiaries are better off when the government does not feel
its rents threatened by the NGO sector.
Figure ?? shows that parameters increasing the share of aid devoted to ser-
vices shift the MB(s) curve upwards, and shift the MC(s) curve downwards.
Because both curves are positively sloped and single crossing, it is easy to see
that parameters making aid more service-intensive increase the equilibrium num-
ber of NGOs, and increase the level of ownership by beneficiaries. Disturbingly,
beneficiaries are better off with a government untroubled by the actions of the
NGO sector.
Corollary 2 If the government has more information on NGOs, it will deliver
more permits and extract larger rents. This slightly increases governance, and
improves the overall well-being of beneficiaries.
The model makes the simplistic assumption that the number of permits n is
the only strategy available to the government. Other observable characteristics of
NGOs can allow the government to expand its strategy set: incomes, activities
in other countries, reputation, and so on, are signals correlated with political
engagement. If the government knows the distribution of these correlated signals,
it can set threshold values such that it will not authorize any NGO above them.
If the threshold monotonically changes with n, then choosing it is equivalent to
fixing a certain number of admissions. For instance, we saw that richer NGOs
are more likely to be politically active. Then, the government will not admit
any NGO richer than a threshold budget bˇ(n∗) in the income distribution. The
comparative statics from λ and ρ on the threshold are thus known. We have
dbˇ(n∗)
dλ
=
dbˇ(n∗)
dn∗
dn∗
dλ
< 0 and
dbˇ(n∗)
dρ
=
dbˇ(n∗)
dn∗
dn∗
dρ
< 0.
The government will allow richer NGOs in areas where they are less influential
or where appropriation efforts are less effective. Notice that, by fixing such
thresholds, allowed NGOs are poorer on average, which shifts the MB(n) curve
upwards, increasing the number of NGOs allowed, total service provision, and
slightly improving ownership. If the authorities can perfectly observe the income
of NGOs, this improves the situation of both beneficiaries and authorities.
13
4 Extensions of the Model
In the previous section, we assumed that NGOs take their decisions indepen-
dently and selfishly. In reality, NGOs often try to coordinate through non-
binding contractual arrangements, for example by signing the Istanbul Declara-
tion (?). By lacking any kind of enforcement, these documents usually remain
vague agreements on common values2. In this section, we explore how changes
in the objective functions of NGOs affect the wellbeing of target populations.
In order to do this, we apply our model to two different objective functions:
first, NGOs give different weights to recipient’s ownership relative to the size of
their project; second, NGOs form partnerships among each other. We show that
these objective functions do not improve the welfare of beneficiaries.
4.1 Focusing on Recipient’s Ownership
First, consider the case where some NGOs decide to focus more citizen’s owner-
ship. In this case, NGOs give more weight to overall beneficiaries appropriation
relative to the focus put on the success of their own project. Each individual
NGO has the following objective function:
ω
1
φi si
in which 1/φi measures NGO i’s focus on citizens’ ownership. If φi = 1, we are
in the benchmark model. The NGO, quite pragmatically, cares about how much
of the service provision it finances do beneficiaries actually own. When φi tends
toward zero, on the contrary, the NGO focuses mainly in improving ownership,
at the cost of pulling resources away from service provision. If, on the contrary,
φi tends toward infinity, then the NGO is unconcerned with appropriation: what
matters to it is to report large expenditures in service provision, whether end-line
beneficiaries appropriate them or not.
Using the same resolution method than in the previous section, we obtain:
v∗ =
λ
1 + λ+ ρnφ
b (17)
and
s∗ =
1 + ρnφ
1 + λ+ ρnφ
b (18)
where φ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
φi is the average weight put on ownership. At the individual
level, we have
si =
φi
φ
λ
1 + λ+ ρnφ
b
2 If these agreements where enforceable, then they should be studied through coalitional
game theory. In our model, unilateral deviation is always profitable: NGOs find it always
individually beneficial to free ride on other’s advocacy. Under these circumstances, coalitional
rationality is violated (?).
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and
vi = bi − φi
φ
λ
1 + λ+ ρnφ
b.
Results are as expected. NGOs more focused on ownership dedicate more
time to advocacy. The description that we get of the NGO sector is now richer:
the emphasis put on ownership by all other NGOs determines the relative effort
devoted to advocacy for any single NGO. For example, if an NGO is pragmatic,
in the sense that it cares only about the efficiency of its own project (φi = 1)
and if around it all other NGOs are unconcerned with ownership, then it will
have to exert more effort in advocacy despite the fact that this action in not in
its initial orientation.
Recall by proposition 2 that the free-ridding problem disappears when
vOP =
λ
1 + λ+ ρ
b
In our framework, it is easy to find that NGOs can avoid the free riding problem
if
φ
∗
=
1
n
. (19)
Once n NGOs are allowed, NGOs willing to make aid more efficient should
optimally increase the overall focus on ownership when the sector is more frac-
tioned. Donors might frown upon NGOs focusing too much on ownership, taking
it as naive idealism. However, this naivet can improve interim efficiency (after
admission of n NGOs) to a certain extent because it allows counterbalancing
free riding inefficiencies.
4.2 NGOs form partnerships
Assume now that NGOs decide to establish partnerships among each other. To
make this simple, suppose that the objective function of any NGO becomes
ω
si + γ∑
j 6=i
sj

in which γ denotes the weight that NGOs give to the projects all other NGOs.
If γ = 1, an NGO gives as much importance to its own project as to the sum
of all other projects. By proceeding by the same method used in the previous
section, at equilibrium we obtain
⇔ v∗ = λ
1 + λ+ ρ n1+γ(n−1)
b (20)
and
s∗ =
1 + ρ n1+γ(n−1)
1 + λ+ ρ n1+γ(n−1)
b. (21)
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The greater the weight attached to the projects of others, the more an NGO
invests in advocacy. Free riding in advocacy is diminished by giving to service
provision the characteristics of a public good as well: NGOs start free riding on
service provision too. Because they are subject to a non-distribution constraint,
the result is that the proportion spent in each activity evens out. The optimal
level of campaigning provided in (13) is reached when
γ∗ = 1 (22)
In words, if NGOs fully internalize the performance of all other NGOs, then the
free riding problem disappears.
Both principles, focusing more on ownership and forming partnerships among
NGOs, make the social optimum attainable at the second stage of the game.
However, if the authorities anticipate that the adoption of these principles threat-
ens their rents, then they will update their optimal level of delivered authoriza-
tions.
The appendix details how the MB(n) and MC(n) curves shift following
changes of φ and γ, summarized in table ??.
∂MB(n) ∂MC(n) ∂MU(n)
∂γ − + −
∂φ + − +
Table 2: Partial derivatives for MB(n) and MC(n) function.
Proposition 4 (Anticipation by the Government) If a rent-seeking author-
ities anticipate that NGOs will adopt principles committing them to reduce free
riding in advocacy, then they will reduce the number of NGOs authorized to
operate in the country.
Proof 4 Identical to the proof of proposition 3, we obtain by implicit differenti-
ation of MU(n∗)
dn∗
dφ
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂φ
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
> 0; and
dn∗
dγ
= − ∂MU(n
∗)/∂γ
∂MU(n∗)/∂n∗
< 0. 
Figure ?? displays how the marginal benefit-marginal cost curves change fol-
lowing attempts to reduce free riding inefficiencies3. Because both curves shift
in opposite directions, and are downward-sloping and single-crossing, trying to
reduce free riding (by either increasing γ or decreasing φ) shifts the equilibrium
point to the north-west. The effect is such that even if appropriation efforts
become cheaper, the reward of appropriation reduces; the net effect is that ap-
propriation efforts become less valuable.
3Recall that s is a bijective increasing function of n.
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φ
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Citizens’ Payoff Government Payoff
Figure 4: Attempts to reduce free-riding reduce the well-being of beneficiaries.
Corollary 3 If corrupt authorities regulate the access of NGOs and anticipate
efforts to reduce free riding inefficiencies, then the welfare of citizens diminishes
when NGOs attempt to reduce free riding. The second-best optimum is obtained
when the NGO sector is uncoordinated, and unconcerned with governance. This
is
γ∗∗ = 0 and φ∗∗ =∞
By (??) and (??), it is impossible to maximize the welfare of beneficiaries and
to wipe out free riding in advocacy simultaneously.
This negative result depends on the fact that the authorities perfectly antic-
ipate that NGOs will coordinate their efforts. Authorities optimize the number
of permits depending on the expected value of φ. In the next subsection, we ex-
plore how results change when the authorities can perfectly observe the degree
at which each NGO focuses on ownership.
4.3 Complete information
Suppose there exist two types of NGOs with parameters φh > φl among the N
NGOs willing to enter the country. Let nh + nl = N define the size of each
group, and as before denote φ the average lack of interest in ownership. By
definition of an average φh > φ > φl. If the authorities can perfectly observe the
types, they first allow all high-type NGOs and optimize n(φh); if the optimal
n∗(φh) ≤ nh, then only high type NGOs are allowed. In this scenario, and by
proposition 4, since allowed NGOs are less politicized, more of them are allowed
and beneficiaries’ ownership increases slightly.
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If n∗(φh) ≤ nh does not hold, the authorities will deliver permits to all high-
type NGOs and allow a few low-type NGOs in. The MB(n) and MC(n) curves
will display a kink at nh with the property that
∂MB(n)
∂φh
≥ ∂MB(n)
∂φ
≥ ∂MB(n)
∂φl
∂MC(n)
∂φh
≤ ∂MC(n)
∂φ
≤ ∂MC(n)
∂φl
MB(n)
MC(n)
n
$
1− κ
nii nh nci
Figure 5: Complete versus incomplete information on the types of NGOs
Figure ?? plots the MB(n)–MC(n) functions and the optimal number of
permits delivered under complete and incomplete information. Under complete
information, initially marginal benefits are higher and and marginal costs are
lower than in the incomplete information case because only high types are allowed
in. If there are rents that can still be appropriated after all high types are allowed,
authorities will allow a few low types, which rapidly decrease marginal benefits
and increase marginal cost for the authorities. At limit conditions (if all N NGOs
willing to enter are allowed or if there are no NGOs) complete and incomplete
information yield the same costs and benefits.
Corollary 4 The number of NGOs allowed under complete information (nci) is
larger than the number of permits delivered under incomplete information (nii).
Welfare of the beneficiaries improves when authorities have complete informa-
tion.
This result is in line with corollary 2. Denote φ the average depoliticization
under complete information. By choosing all high types, it follows that φnci ≥
φnii. Comparing the advocacy to service provision ratio (v/s) in both regimes
we obtain:
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λ1 + φnci
<
λ
1 + ρnφ
Asymmetries of information increase the advocacy content of aid, partially
attenuating the free riding inefficiency. However, because this makes the author-
ities shrink the NGO sector too much, beneficiaries are overall better off when
authorities have complete information despite the fact that free riding issues are
exacerbated.
5 Discussion
The recent surge in the number of development NGOs justify our assumptions
on the atomicity of the sector, substantiating our representation of NGOs as
agents, and host governments as principals. Competition among NGOs reduces
their bargaining power in front of host governments, akin to what occurs in
markets. NGOs will deliver aid as long as their participation constraint is satis-
fied. Although, in the model, we normalize the outside option to zero, in reality
outside options are such that host governments do not have to worry about at-
tracting NGOs. Additionally, many NGOs perceive providing inefficient aid as
an improvement over not providing aid at all: NGOs will enter the country if
host countries give them the opportunity.
The consideration of NGOs providing both advocacy and service provision comes
from the recent High level Fora on aid effectivness that see NGOs as instru-
ment to enhance development and democracy. But in reality by the late 1990’s
donors already saw in the provision of services by NGOs an insufficient mean of
promoting development (?). Poverty-alleviating services were only treating the
symptoms, not the causes, of structural poverty; NGOs agreed that institutional
change was required to achieve effective long-run development. Institutional
change meant advocating for new rights for the poor, and curtailing privileges of
the ruling elite. This shift toward advocacy was easier said than done: it bore the
risks of confronting the local authorities, of frightening donors concerned with
diplomatic affairs, and required substantial coordination efforts among NGOs,
in particular to agree upon a shared vision of institutional change. Even when
NGOs overcome these institutional barriers, advocacy might not have the hoped
influence on the local population. The message might be too weak, or too uncon-
vincing, or outright wrong in the eyes of beneficiaries. For example, ? finds that
NGOs are conductive of political change in small and poor municipalities in Bo-
livia, which are politically disorganized, but not in larger, richer municipalities,
in which trade unions and political parties outnoise NGOs. The sensitivity to the
message is captured in the model by parameter λ. Even if people are willing to
listen, fear of repressive governments may deters civilians from demanding new
rights. Among several examples, one could quote the assassination of 17 local
workers of Action Contre la Faim (a French NGO) by the Sri Lankan military
in 2006 (?). The repressive capacity of the state is captured by parameter ρ.
Changing institutional arrangements injures the privileges of the established
elite. In the model, the conflict of interests arising between the elite and in-
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tended beneficiaries over aid resources is very stylized. In it, the elite steal
whatever beneficiaries do not appropriate. This exaggeration impersonates more
subtle phenomena of embezzlement: nongovernmental aid reduces demands for
accountability addressed to the state, redirecting public funds toward private
interest; procedures in situ can impose that third part-contracts, for instance in
construction, are procured by fraudulent enterprises; or corrupt officials might
outright extort and blackmail NGO workers. A frequent practice is that local
bureaucrats organize schemes to purchase alimentary aid at subsidized prices to
resale it at market prices (?). Another way in which authorities can extract rents
from nongovernmental aid is by allowing them to operate only where they will be
less effective. A collective of NGOs operating in Zambia denounced the adoption
of a bill prohibiting NGOs from operating in certain domains and geographical
regions (?). The model predicts that governments will permit NGOs where they
will be unable to promote institutional change, in line with what NGOs operat-
ing in Zambia fear. Similar stringent laws were adopted in Russia (?), Venezuela
(?) and Egypt (?), among others. NGOs understand that coordination efforts
can improve their prospects of achieving institutional change, by increasing their
bargaining power.
In regard to the NGOs’ side, their intent is to integrate in the debate at the
High Level Fora on aid effectiveness. In 2011, an Open Forum for Civil Society
Organizations adopted the ?, which is a list of eight commitments addressed at
improving the efficiency of nongovernmental aid. In the model, we explore how
the adoption of such principles would affect the wellbeing of target populations.
We apply our model to two principles: first, NGOs are encouraged by the prin-
ciples to ‘focus on citizens’ ownership’ (parameter φ); second, NGOs are called
to ‘pursue partnerships with other NGOs’ (parameter γ). We show that the
strict adherence to these principles does not necessarily improve the welfare of
beneficiaries, because full coordination will reduce the incentives of host govern-
ments to deliver permits to NGOs. Donor states have the political grit to ask
from recipient countries adequate regulation of the NGO sector. German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel appealed Russian president Vladimir Putin to give NGOs
a chance’, following the crackdown of the sector in 2013; this appeal remains
unheard (?).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a model of the political economy of nongovernmental
organizations. We focus on the case in which NGOs deliver foreign aid in weakly
institutionalized countries. In a game-theoretical framework, players are a large
number of heterogeneous NGOs, the government of a developing country, and
the people living in this country. NGOs can take two actions: they provide
poverty-alleviating services, and they advocate the rights of the poor. Advocacy
encourages beneficiaries to demand better accountability to their government.
Because the benefits of advocacy have the characteristics of a public good, ad-
vocacy will be typically under-provided. NGOs can remedy the problems of free
riding by increasing efforts in coordination. However, these efforts threaten the
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rents of corrupt officials, who will respond by cracking down on the operations
of NGOs. The costs of this crackdown can outweight the benefits from investing
in advocacy, turning a situation where no one free rides in advocacy into an
undesirable outcome.
We strongly stylize the behaviour of the government and the local population
to focus on the NGO sector. The assumption that all government officials are
pure rent-seekers, or that the local population is a monolithic decision-taking unit
are certainly unrealistic. However, by presenting a reduced-form optimization
program for the local population and for the government, we are able to elaborate
further on the constraints and strategies adopted by NGOs while maintaining
analytical tractability.
Results of our model suggest that proponents of a bottom-up approach to
development should not dismiss the role of multilateral and bilateral donors (??).
In particular, we belive that the solution for aid effectivness lies in an integrate
approach in which NGOs channel aid and they are supported by bilateral and
multilateral donors that use their diplomatic and economic power capable of
demanding that an enabling environment is set in place.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma ?? Replace the value of n in (??) by its non-distribution
constraint value n = (s+ v)/b. This yields
λ
v
s
= 1 + ρ(s+ v)/b (23)
Implicit differentiation of v by s and multiplication by s/v obtains:
ε =
dv
ds
s
v
=
λvs − ρb s
λvs +
ρ
b
v
Plugging back in (??) gives
ε =
1 + vρ/b
1 + vρ/b+ bρ/b
which easily reduces to the desired equation using (??). 
Comparative statics of the MB(n) and MC(n) curves holding n
constant.
We provide the comparative statics for the full model, i.e including parameters φ
and γ included in the extensions. This addition does not affect the comparative
statics of the basic model and diminishes redundant computations. In the second
stage Nash equilibrium we obtain:
s∗ =
1 + ρφ n1+γ(n−1)
1 + λ+ ρφ n1+γ(n−1)
bn and v∗ =
λ
1 + λ+ ρφ n1+γ(n−1)
bn
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7.1 Comparative statics for MB(n) = 1− ω
Taking the logarithm of the third stage equilibrium condition (??) we obtain
ln(ω) =
(1 + ρ)ln(κ) + ln(s) + λln(v)− ln(1 + ρ)
ρ
.
Partial derivatives yield
∇ω(ρ, λ, b, κ, γ, φ) = 1
ρ


ds
dρ
1
s + λ
dv
dρ
1
v
ds
dλ
1
s + λ
dv
dλ
1
v
ds
db
1
s + λ
dv
dκ
1
v
ds
dκ
1
s + λ
dv
db
1
v
ds
dγ
1
s + λ
dv
dγ
1
v
ds
dφ
1
s + λ
dv
dφ
1
v

+

ln(κ)− 11+ρ − ln(ω)
ln(v)
0
(1 + ρ)/κ
0
0


By bn = s+ v:
∇ω(ρ, λ, b, κ, γ, φ) = 1
ρ

(
1
s
− λ1
v
)

ds
dρ
ds
dλ
ds
db
ds
dκ
ds
dγ
ds
dφ

+

ln(κ)− 11+ρ − ln(ω)
ln(v)
0
(1 + ρ)/κ
0
0


By
s
v
=
1 + ρφ n1+γ(n−1)
λ
∇ω(ρ, λ, b, κ, γ, φ) = 1
ρ

−
ρφ n1+γ(n−1)
s

ds
dρ
ds
dλ
ds
db
ds
dκ
ds
dγ
ds
dφ

+

ln(κ)− 11+ρ − ln(ω)
ln(v)
0
(1 + ρ)/κ
0
0


By ω(a) = κ(1 + a)
1
1+ρ
∇ω(ρ, λ, b, κ, γ, φ) = 1
ρ

−
ρφ n1+γ(n−1)
s

ds
dρ
ds
dλ
ds
db
ds
dκ
ds
dγ
ds
dφ

+

− 11+ρ(ln(1 + a) + 1)
ln(v)
0
(1 + ρ)/κ
0
0


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By s∗ =
1 + ρφ n1+γ(n−1)
1 + λ+ ρφ n1+γ(n−1)
bn
∇ω(ρ, λ, b, κ, γ, φ) =

< 0
> 0
> 0
> 0
> 0
< 0
⇒ ∇MB(ρ, λ, b, κ, γ, φ) =

> 0
< 0
< 0
< 0
< 0
> 0


7.2 Comparative statics for MC(n) =
1 + λε
1 + ρ+ λε
Proceeding like in the proof of lemma ??, we obtain the elasticity for the general
case
ε =
1
1 +
1
1
ρφ n
1+γ(n−1)
+ λ
1+λ+ρφ n
1+γ(n−1)
The denominator in the second term of the denominator decreases in ρ and φ,
and increases in γ.  moves in the same direction. It is easy to verify that:
∇MC(ρ, λ, b, κ, γ, φ) =

< 0
> 0
0
0
> 0
< 0


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